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manera negativa, es decir, en diferencia
hacia un fuera o una presión de cambio
social. Por lo tanto, en el interior de una
cultura de la memoria no encontramos una
memoria grupal homogénea sino distin-
tos/as actores con intereses histórico-polí-
ticos interconectados/as en una relación
de fuerzas cambiante. Con ellos/as, a
menudo se trata de otras culturas de la
memoria específicas que luchan por la
interpretación de la historia común. Las
tensiones entre grupos (en muchos casos
con memorias colectivas contradictorias
entre sí) siguen existiendo y los/las acto-
res/as pueden intentar modificar las rela-
ciones de fuerzas y, de este modo, estable-
cer nuevas coordenadas culturales para el
conjunto de la sociedad.
Todo lo dicho arriba supone que mi
idea de la cultura de la memoria implica
una estructura dinámica, un marco que
guía interpretaciones y acciones y que
influye sobre los/las actores/as en sus
prácticas, pero que también puede ser
transformado por ellos/as. Sobre la base
del concepto gramsciano de cultura, se
puede redefinir el término “cultura de la
memoria”: como marco de referencias
colectivas al pasado de una comunidad,
un marco surgido históricamente y, a
pesar del potencial de persistencia hege-
monial, dinámico, en el cual narrativas
dominantes y opuestas (sub)culturas de la
memoria con sus respectivas estrategias
histórico-políticas compiten por las rela-
ciones de poder interpretativo sobre la
historia (Molden, Berthold: “Mnemohe-
gemonics. Geschichtspolitik und Erinne-
rungskultur im Ringen um Hegemonie”.
En: Molden, Berthold/Mayer, David
[eds.]: Vielstimmige Vergangenheiten.
Geschichtspolitik in Lateinamerika. Viena
2009: LIT, pp. 31-56). Esta idea reviste
también una fuerte vinculación con los
marcos sociales descritos por Maurice
Halbwachs, que resultan de central impor-
tancia para delinear límites entre distintas
culturas de la memoria. De ella se deriva
además la demanda de una investigación
de tales comunidades de memoria capaz
de establecer diferencias tanto a nivel
transnacional como en el interior de socie-
dades particulares.
Berthold Molden es Mellon Scholar y Visiting
Assistant Professor en la Universidad de Chi-
cago y lector en la Universidad de Viena. El
autor agradece a Pilar Cabañas por la traduc-
ción de este artículo. Correo electrónico: 
berthold.molden@univie.ac.at. 
Nina Schneider
Truth no more? The Struggle
over the National Truth
Commission in Brazil
On 13 January 2010, the magazine,
Veja, published an article entitled ‘Coisa
de maluco’ (perhaps best translated as
‘Matter of a madman’). The article includ-
ed a picture of the Brazilian Special Min-
ister of Human Rights at the time, Paulo
Vannuchi, with the caption: ‘Not Human:
The Federal Minister Paulo Vannuchi, ex-
militant of a terrorist group and drafter of
that decree: if it did not work with a
revolver, he does it with a pen’. It satirises
the so-called Third National Programme
of Human Rights, or PNDH-3 – a pro-
gramme created by Vannuchi – which
contains 521 suggestions to improve the
human rights situation in Brazil. The
plan’s key proposal is to create a National
Truth Commission (NCT) to investigate
human rights violations during the mili-
tary regime in Brazil (1964-1985). On 21
December 2009, the Brazilian President,
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, signed the
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PNDH-3 proposal. Two days later, the
Brazilian Defence Minister, Nelson Jobim,
and Brazil’s three leading military gener-
als threatened to resign over the creation
of the NCT. This contribution explains the
history of this recent governmental crisis
and elucidates how Vannuchi’s proposal
to create a NCT reignited the struggle
over the memory of the military regime.
My aim is to identify the key agents
involved in this struggle, explain their
positions, and examine the way they
defend a particular version of the military
past to increase their power in present day
Brazil. 
Collective Memory as a Constant
Struggle
I am interested in agents who try to
influence how the military regime is
remembered by the wider Brazilian public,
or what is often loosely termed ‘collective
memory’. Several scholars have criticised
the concept of ‘collective memory’ on the
grounds that it is imprecise from a method-
ological point of view. Peter Burke, for
example, has cautioned that it remains a
challenge to determine when it is reason-
able to generalise from individual memory
to a collective or national memory. Rather
than determining the existence or nature of
a collective memory, this piece focuses on
the battle over collective memory defined
here as the remembering of large sectors of
the Brazilian population. Collective mem-
ory is understood as a constant struggle in
which specific narratives of the past do not
simply continue, but require constant
reproduction. I adopt Antonio Gramsci’s
sophisticated and historically specific
understanding of society as being in a state
of constant struggle over ‘social, political
and cultural leadership’ and apply it to the
realm of memory. 
The Key Agents: Vannuchi and Jobim
Since Paulo Vannuchi became Brazil-
ian Special Minister of Human Rights in
2005, he has been a key driving force in
the Lula government for bringing the mili-
tary regime into the realm of public debate.
Vannuchi’s experiences during the mili-
tary regime have left a deep impression on
his personal life. Born in 1950 in São
Paulo, he joined the clandestine opposi-
tion group, National Liberation Action
(ALN), under Carlos Marighella, at the
age of eighteen. Vannuchi was imprisoned
in 1971 and remained a political prisoner
for five years, during which time he suf-
fered brutal torture. His cousin, Alexandre
Leme Vannuchi, tragically gained promi-
nence when he was tortured to death in
1973. Yet, Minister Vannuchi has been
reluctant to discuss the torture that he suf-
fered and in this way has avoided being
labelled as ‘vindictive’ or ‘revanchista’.
‘Revanchism’ (revanchismo) – a key term
in the memory discourse – is a biased
expression which dismisses critical
demands, including the clarification of
torture, as a quest for personal vengeance
rather than a public duty. After his dis-
charge in 1976, Vannuchi resumed his
studies, gained a Bachelor’s degree in
journalism, followed by a Master’s degree
in political science. Affiliated to the Work-
er’s Party (PT) since its inception, he
worked as a political consultant to the PT,
and a political advisor in Lula’s election
campaigns. Vannuchi also worked on the
first major report on human rights viola-
tions during the regime – Brazil Never
Again – organised by the archdiocese of
São Paulo.
Vannuchi’s life story is strongly influ-
enced by his experiences of imprisonment
and torture. Vannuchi has been responsi-
ble for a major human rights project: ‘The
Right of Memory and Truth’. Initiated in
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2006, it included the publication of the
final report of the Special Commission of
Dead [or Killed] and Disappeared for
Political Reasons. The 2007 Commis-
sion’s Report can be interpreted as an
updated edition of the ‘Brazil Never
Again’ report of 1985, to which Vannuchi
himself had contributed, the crucial differ-
ence being, however, that the former was
published by the state. Furthermore, the
project integrated the inauguration of sev-
eral monuments in honour of students and
workers assassinated under military rule,
and a touring exhibition.
Vannuchi’s main antagonist on many
occasions has been Defence Minister, Nel-
son Jobim, who was born in 1946 and has
held office since 2005. As Defence Minis-
ter, Jobim holds the position of formal
leadership over the three branches of the
armed forces. After graduating in Social
and Legal Sciences from the Federal Uni-
versity of Rio Grande do Sul in 1968,
Jobim has carved out an impressive legal
career, rising to some of Brazil’s highest
judicial positions. In 1987, he was elected
federal deputy for the Party of the Brazil-
ian Democratic Movement (PMDB). The
PMDB evolved out of the Brazilian Demo-
cratic Movement (MDB), the only opposi-
tion party allowed by the military regime
since the installation of a two-party system
in 1965. His party affiliation suggests that,
unlike a significant number of military
officials, he is not a fervent defender of the
military regime. Between 1995 and 1997
Jobim had already served as Minister of
Justice under former President, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, who appointed him to
the Brazilian Supreme Court in 1997. In
2002, Jobim became President of the
Superior Election Tribunal (TSE), the
Brazilian institution responsible for trans-
parent elections. In 2004, the experienced
judicial expert became President of the
Brazilian Supreme Court and, in 2005, he
was appointed President of the National
Justice Council. 
The Blackmailing Process 
On 21 December 2009, President Lula
signed the PNDH-3, thereby approving its
key proposal – a Brazilian NCT to investi-
gate human rights violations during the
military regime. Confronted with the res-
ignations of Minister Jobim and the three
military officials, Lula promised to amend
the proposal. It remains unclear whether
Jobim initiated the protest or whether he
simply supported the officials’ decision.
According to military statements, the gen-
erals took action and the Defence Minister
subsequently joined them in a show of
solidarity; however, this has not been con-
firmed by Jobim. General Enzo Martins
Peri and Brigadier Juniti Saito condemned
the PNDH-3 as ‘excessively insulting,
aggressive and vindictive [revanchista]’.
In particular, military officials contested
the suggestion to uncover sites of repres-
sion, and to prohibit the naming of streets,
squares and monuments after officials
involved in human rights violations. Van-
nuchi publicly refuted the allegation that
the NTC was ‘against the armed forces’:
‘To create a Truth Commission is an act in
favour of the armed forces (…). These
officials cannot be compared with half a
dozen (…) or two dozen who captured
political opponents, undressed them and
sexually tortured them (…). This is a fatal
mistake and I am certain the Defence
Minister [Jobim] knows this’. Vannuchi
reacted to Jobim’s political manoeuvre
with a similar tactic: he threatened to
resign from Lula’s government if the
modified PNDH-3 incorporated the pun-
ishment of the militant opposition. Under
pressure from both sides, Lula summoned
Vannuchi and Jobim to a crisis meeting.
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Online press coverage by the daily news-
paper, Estadão, suggests that Lula himself
was unprepared for the sudden crisis. He
ordered his cabinet to stop blackmailing
him and to make a positive contribution to
his last year in office. 
The original PNDH-3, its amendments
and new protest 
The crisis meeting in January 2010
resulted in a decree that modified the most
fiercely opposed passages in the PNDH-3:
The expression, ‘in a context of political
repression’ (referring to human rights vio-
lations) was replaced by the phrase ‘in a
context of political conflicts’. The specifi-
cation of who committed the human rights
violations – military officials or the mili-
tant opposition to the regime – was erased.
Vannuchi accepted the amendments and
told the press that ‘at the moment’ he
would not leave his post, alluding to
potential frictions in the future. Despite
the decree which installed a working
group to prepare the changes in detail, the
main text of the program remained valid.
Even after the decree, members of the
government have tried to pacify the situa-
tion and emphasize the spirit of reconcili-
ation. On 15 January 2010, Lula declared
in a TV interview that the NCT was not a
‘witch hunt’. During a public hearing
Jobim denied that he had opposed a NCT
in principle, but merely objected to its use
for a specific purpose: ‘[N]either the
Defence Ministry nor the armed forces
ever opposed the creation of the Truth
Commission; what the Defence Minister
rejected was the creation of a Truth Com-
mission to clarify a unilateral truth’. In a
public Senate meeting, Vannuchi tried a
more conciliatory approach by declaring
that the revised text was not ‘vindictive’.
It was unfair, Vannuchi repeated, that the
armed forces should be expected to shoul-
der the guilt of a dozen torturers, murder-
ers, rapists or persons who committed
‘revolting crimes’. In addition, Vannuchi
clarified that the members of the NCT
should neither be military personnel nor
relatives of victims of the regime.
Yet, the modifications prompted new
protests among various supporters of Van-
nuchi. The President of the Brazilian
Lawyers’Association (OAB), Cezar Britto,
for example, denounced Jobim and the mil-
itary officials for exerting pressure on Lula,
and even called for Jobim’s removal. Van-
nuchi received further backing from the
Justice Minister at the time, Tarso Genro,
and numerous human rights organizations
who protested by launching online peti-
tions in favour of the original NCT. The
families of victims who were prosecuting
the Brazilian state in front of the OAS
blamed the Lula government for continu-
ing to hamper efforts to open the archives
and search for the dead bodies. The inter-
national human rights organization, Global
Justice, threatened to denounce Brazil
before the Organization of American States
(OAS) and the United Nations (UN) if the
original PNDH-3 is not enforced. Global
Justice’s executive director attacked that
the program was altered after military
forces blackmailed the President, a proce-
dure she accurately described as a ‘risk for
(…) democracy’. Moreover, numerous
intellectuals have criticised the alterations
to the PNDH-3, including the former
Brazilian Human Rights Minister, Paulo
Sérgio Pinheiro, who is a member of the
working group set up to modify the propos-
al. Pinheiro likewise condemned the black-
mailing of the president, denied that the
expression, ‘political repression’, has been
changed, and defended the NTC as neces-
sary within the Latin American context,
alluding to the fact that other countries in
the Southern Cone established Truth Com-
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missions much earlier. The armed forces,
Pinheiro insisted, had nothing to fear, as
the NCT was concerned with truth and
information rather than punishment. Over-
all, while the additional decree was
designed to resolve the most controversial
aspects of the PNDH-3, it prompted
protests from human rights activists and
agents of civil society who had supported
or even contributed to the original plan. On
the day the working group presented the
modified text, Folha Online asked Van-
nuchi if he was satisfied: ‘No, not satisfied.
That would suggest that I am happy (…)
and that is not the case’. His reaction is not
surprising given the personal attacks Van-
nuchi has suffered from the media; he com-
mented: ‘I will wake up early tomorrow to
read the newspapers and the reactions
against my changes hoping they will not be
as derogatory as “ideological psychopath”
or “devilish product” ’.
The duel extended – the role of the
media
Parts of the Brazilian media, I argue,
have exploited this governmental crisis to
attack not only the original proposal for a
NCT but also to discredit the Lula govern-
ment in the run-up to the 2010 presidential
elections. The Brazilian media are largely
privately owned and often portrayed as
conservative, or in the words of Maria
Helena R. Capelato: ‘afraid of democracy’.
To briefly illustrate these media attacks,
the article from Veja magazine entitled
‘Coisa de maluco’ – already alluded to –
repeats the term ‘ex-terrorist’ instead of
Vannuchi’s official designation, Federal
Minister. It blames him for ‘revanchism’,
and brings into disrepute the entire Lula
government by labelling it ‘crazy’ (‘samba
do petista doido’) and ‘bolchevique’.
Human rights, the article alleges, are only
a ‘pretext’ enabling Vannuchi to disguise
his true mission: fulfilling his political
agenda. My main point here is to show that
Veja magazine is not interested in an hon-
est discussion about the NCT, but intends
to construct Vannuchi and the entire Lula
government as insane, and portray Van-
nuchi as a disguised communist infiltrator
– the ex-terrorist who is now ‘attacking
with the pen’. It appears that this type of
accusation has become familiar in Latin
America as a way of refuting politically
inconvenient news. Former Argentinean
President, Carlos Menem, once levelled
the same accusation – ‘a terrorist with a
pen’ – at Horacio Verbitsky, who received
several awards. Although this specific
piece illustrates this bias very clearly, large
sections of the press used a similarly dis-
paraging tone to discredit the proposal and
reduce what should be a historic step to the
status of mudslinging in the run up to the
2010 presidential elections. The term ‘ex-
terrorist’ has also been used by other jour-
nals without explaining the context of the
military regime, and yet they do not apply
the term to officials involved in the repres-
sive system. In a similar vein to Veja mag-
azine, the Estado de São Paulo wrote that
the government ‘uses the United Nations
as a shield for its National Programme of
Human Rights’, suggesting that human
rights merely serve as a pretext for power.
The use of the term ‘terrorist’ has also been
criticized by Vladimir Safatle, Professor of
Philosophy at the University of São Paulo.
Safatle rejects this term when used to
describe former members of the militant
opposition, as it undermines the fact that
the state who introduced this word was an
illegal state. Hence, whoever uses the term
‘terrorist’ is reproducing the vocabulary of
a repressive state and concealing the ille-
gitimacy of the regime. 
The media’s biased tone has also been
noticed by an independent group of intel-
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lectuals who are systematically examining
the Brazilian Press, the so-called Press
Observatory (OI), initiated by the distin-
guished journalist, Alberto Dines. In an
article published by the OI, Marcos Rolim
perceptively criticises the media for
broadcasting imprecise news and trying to
manipulate their readers. Rolim, who was
personally involved in redrafting the final
text of the PNDH-3, calls the portrayal of
the plan as a disposition for a ‘communist
dictatorship’, a ‘farce’, and points out that
the milder version of a ‘Truth Commis-
sion’ was eventually chosen instead of a
‘Justice and Truth Commission’ which
would have included legal prosecutions.
Rolim makes another noteworthy point;
he recalls that several aspects now causing
objection, had been incorporated in previ-
ous national human rights programs creat-
ed during the presidency of Fernando
Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). The fact
that they were not criticised previously
confirms the political agenda of the press,
as well as public disinterest in the matter.
Luciano Martins Costa likewise criticises
the media for polarising opinion rather
than providing information, and points out
that the Brazilian Lawyers’ Association
(OAB) is not an association of ‘terrorists’,
but a respected legal institution. 
While struggle and negotiation are
part of the fabric of politics and the criti-
cism of detailed points of the proposal
may well be justified, the key point here is
that this debate is not constructive, but an
obvious struggle over political power. It is
noteworthy that the PNDH-3 was elabo-
rated in a lengthy and democratic proce-
dure that involved both state officials and
representatives of civil society. In all, 137
so-called ‘free conferences’ were orga-
nized on a federal, regional and municipal
level, actively involving a total of 14,000
people from various groups of civil soci-
ety. The National Human Rights Confer-
ence in 2008 produced the skeleton docu-
ment for the program, and approved sug-
gestions from more than 50 conferences
have been incorporated into the plan,
‘reflecting’, as President Lula states in the
preface of the PNDH-3, ‘an ample democ-
ratic debate’ about human rights. That the
debates and negotiations held during two
years should result in an attempt by the
armed forces to blackmail the President,
and ferocious media attacks against stated
‘terrorists’, is very revealing about the
nature of democracy in Brazil.
Truth no more?
It is fair to say that the historical
importance of the NCT fell prey to the
2010 presidential election campaign and
resulted in a dirty political struggle,
although the two main candidates share a
history of opposition to the regime and to
political persecution. While the winning
candidate Dilma Roussef (PT), who
belonged to militant opposition groups,
experienced prison and torture, José Serra
of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party
(PSDB) was the leader of the National
Student Union (UNE) and went into exile
in 1964. During the election campaign in
late 2010, both candidates clearly stated
that they wished to avoid politicizing the
NCT, in contrast to the media. Nonethe-
less – as I have shown– large parts of the
mainstream media used this incident to
discredit members of the Lula govern-
ment, in particular, Vannuchi. They dis-
credited democratic institutions and pro-
cedures, withheld information and sabo-
taged constructive criticism – they fail to
promote a reasonable, open and honest
culture of debate. 
While the power struggles could not
prevent Roussef from winning the elec-
tions, it is noteworthy that Vannuchi has
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not been reappointed to office, while
Defence Minister, Jobim, remains in
charge. As a consequence of the crisis, the
preparations for the NCT have slowed
down significantly. In May 2010, the law
proposal for the NCT (No. 7.376/2010)
already reached the Chamber of Deputies
who still has not appointed the members
of a special commission responsible for
analysing the proposal. The new Human
Rights Minister, Maria do Rosário, has
publicly refused to speed up the process
(tramitação de urgência). In her opening
speech she praised the armed forces and
promised to cooperate with Defence Min-
ister Jobim. In December 2010, she told
the press that President Dilma wanted to
handle the NCT with ‘patience’ and ‘in
dialogue’. This indicates that Dilma has
learned a lesson from the crisis and aims
to avoid a major conflict at the beginning
of her presidency. Yet, problems are lurk-
ing; eventually the NCT has to be ratified
by the Brazilian Congress. To this point, it
remains undecided when the NCT will be
instated and under what terms. It is
planned that the NCT will work for two
years, and the members of the Commis-
sion will be appointed by the Brazilian
President. Although the NCT had always
been intended as a truth rather than a jus-
tice commission, the Supreme Court’s
decision in April 2010 to maintain the
1979 Amnesty Law has closed the avenue
of punishment further. The NCT will take
testimonies, pressure for further access to
archives, and stimulate public debate. The
clarification of cases of murder and tor-
ture, along with the reclamation of dead
bodies will not only meet the legitimate
demands of the families of victims, but
also gather historic information from
which to comprehend the mechanisms of
state repression during the military regime. 
The recent struggle over the NCT and
its repercussions exemplify Brazil’s diffi-
culties in coming to terms with its military
past. On the one hand, the reservoir of
memory elements surrounding the regime
was exploited during the 2010 elections,
in particular, to discredit the Lula govern-
ment and weaken the PT. On the other
hand, the recent struggle represents a con-
tinuation of authoritarian legacies which
have long characterized the transition
process peculiar to Brazil: the denial of
the military legacy; the lack of condemna-
tion of the authoritarian state – even in
seemingly harmless words like ‘terror-
ists’, ‘ditabranda’ or ‘revanchismo’ – and
the seemingly infinite desire for compro-
mise, for which the watered-down NCT is
a case in point. 
Nina Schneider has recently finished her PhD
at the University of Essex, UK, and is currently
working at the Institute for European and
Extra-European History at the FernUniver-
sität Hagen, the Open University of Germany.
Email: Nina.Schneider@FernUni-Hagen.de.
Pamela Colombo
Espacios de confrontación 
y desaparición en Tucumán,
Argentina
Lo que dice el espacio
La desaparición forzada de personas
conmueve aún el espacio, aunque los ras-
tros de esa experiencia parecieran –a pri-
mera vista– haberse vuelto parte de un
paisaje inocente. La última dictadura cívi-
co-militar en Argentina (1976-1983) cul-
minó hace ya casi más de tres décadas; sin
embargo, la materialidad de los campos de
concentración continúa siendo parte del
entramado urbano y rural, la mayoría de
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